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FOREWORD
Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida and
its affiliates and offshoots operate in the Middle East
and Africa have a predominantly tribal or at least have
a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,
Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Countering Al-Qaida’s continuing presence, therefore, requires addressing the
tribal milieu and understanding Al-Qaida’s critical
vulnerabilities when it operates in tribal societies. In
this context, the capability that tribally-based militias
provide may be one of the most effective tools against
Al-Qaida, and may offer a cost-effective mechanism
serving as a force multiplier for U.S. forces. It could
reduce the need for U.S. force commitment on the
ground in environments that might offer unfavorable
conditions for a U.S. Landpower footprint.
It is important to appreciate the vulnerabilities that
Al-Qaida faces in dealing with tribes inherent in the
dilemma between implementing its ideological and
political program and the social realities that are likely
to generate conflict, such as Islamic vs. tribal law, folk
religion, social and economic mores, and the presence
of outsiders, not including the challenge to traditional
tribal leaderships that Al-Qaida’s influence may entail. Given this environment, it is therefore not surprising that tribally-based militias can be organized
and function as an effective supportive counter in the
effort against Al-Qaida.
In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar identifies
two models for tribal militias—either managed by local governments and supported by outside patrons or
managed directly by an outside agent. The resulting
dynamic is most often a triangular one among AlQaida, the tribes, and the local government. It must
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be studied within that perspective, as Al-Qaida “has
a vote” in the ensuing struggle as it attempts to adapt.
Dr. Cigar focuses on the experience in Iraq and Yemen, but some lessons learned may be applicable more
broadly. While the positive results may be significant,
as in the case of Iraq and Yemen, there are cautionary
guidelines to be drawn from past experience for the
creation and functioning of such tribal militias that
could mark the difference between success or ultimate
failure, including balancing the local government’s
dilemma between encouraging an effective counter to
Al-Qaida and managing the threat from such autonomous forces in the long run.
This monograph notes a number of lessons learned
for the United States while acting as the direct managing patron of these groups. Among them are the
following:
• to understand the strengths and limitations of
tribal militias and shape the latter’s roles and
missions accordingly;
• to support a tribal militia adequately in material terms;
• to provide effective protection for key tribal militia leaders;
• to ensure that the U.S. management and use of
tribal militias do not undercut an existing or
emerging government’s legitimacy;
• to craft a realistic and effective demobilization
plan; and to conduct an effective information
campaign directed toward the parent tribes.
When the United States acts as a support agent for
tribal militias managed by a local government, the
lessons learned include:
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• providing funding, arms, selected operational
support, and intelligence;
• advising the local government on how to best
deal with the tribal militias; and,
• advising and supporting other countries that
might act in the future as potential patrons of
tribal militias.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as part of its continuing effort to inform the debate on dealing with the continuing threat
of Al-Qaida and related movements. This analysis
should be useful to help strategic leaders, planners,
intelligence professionals, and commanders to better understand the challenges of the contemporary
strategic landscape in the Middle East and to craft
effective responses.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Despite over a decade of open war, dealing with
Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Middle East is likely
to remain a concern for the foreseeable future and will
pose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that is
likely to be effective in meeting the threat. Most of
the local societies in which Al-Qaida has operated in
the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001,
have a predominantly tribal character or at least have
a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,
Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools to
counter Al-Qaida’s continuing presence in that social
environment, therefore, is a priority and requires understanding Al-Qaida’s critical vulnerabilities when it
operates in those societies and developing the means
to counter Al-Qaida’s efforts.
This monograph addresses the role of tribal militias in the context of the fight against Al-Qaida. The
intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify options
for future operations by focusing on past experience
in order to identify the positive and negative aspects
related to the use of such militias. The focus in this
monograph is on Iraq and Yemen. However, many
of the lessons learned may be applied more broadly.
The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-based
militias provide may be one of the most efficient, costeffective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, such
militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S. Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground in significant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias can
reduce the need for a U.S. commitment on the ground
in environments that might present unfavorable conditions for a significant U.S. Landpower footprint.
At the same time, given the complexity of the local
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political environment, tribal militias are no panacea,
but can be a two-edged sword. Like any weapon, the
use of tribal militias has to be understood and wielded
with caution and skill in order to avoid unintended
consequences.
This discussion includes two models for the tribal
militias based on the nature of their patron. In Model
1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model
2, the national government is the patron (although an
outside entity may provide ancillary support). The
first case study deals with a Model 1 situation, where
a foreign patron—the United States—acted in that role
in Iraq beginning in late-2006 and lasting through the
hand-over to Iraqi authorities during the period from
December 2008 to April 2009. The second case study
deals with two ongoing Model 2 situations, again with
Iraq, but taking place after the national government’s
assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in
2009. This case study is especially useful for comparative purposes with the first case study. The third case
study deals with Yemen, where the local government
has acted as the militia patron since 2012.
Based on the experience from Iraq and Yemen, this
monograph concludes that the positive results of using tribal militias in the fight against Al-Qaida and
its offshoots may be significant. Within the context
of fighting against Al-Qaida, encouraging and supporting any armed local constituency—such as Iraq’s
tribes—may be a reasonable or even an unavoidable
option at a particular juncture in time for an outside
power or for a local patron in dealing with that insurgency. Nevertheless, as is often true in the real world,
this is not a panacea and, based on past experience,
there are cautionary guidelines to be remembered for
the creation and functioning of such tribal militias that
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could make the difference between success or ultimate
failure. Each of the two models studied has political
and military advantages and disadvantages, but one
may not have the luxury of which option to select in a
specific situation.
Among the recommendations for policy in those
situations where the United States is a tribal militia’s
direct patron are to:
•	
understand the strengths and limitations of
tribal militias and shape the latter’s roles and
missions accordingly;
•	support a tribal militia adequately in material
terms;
•	provide effective protection for key tribal militia leaders from inevitable Al-Qaida efforts to
eliminate them;
•	ensure that the U.S. management and use of
tribal militias do not undercut an existing or
emerging government’s legitimacy;
•	
craft a realistic and effective demobilization
plan; and,
•	
conduct an effective information campaign
directed toward the tribes.
When the United States is in a supporting role to
the local government, among the recommendations
are to:
•	
provide funding, arms, selected operational
support, and intelligence channeled through
the patron local government;
•	advise the local government as to the best way
to deal with the tribal militias; and,
•	
advise and support other countries that
might act in the future as potential patrons of
tribal militias.
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TRIBAL MILITIAS:
AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COUNTER AL-QAIDA
AND ITS AFFILIATES?
INTRODUCTION
Despite over a decade of open war, dealing with
Al-Qaida in the Middle East is likely to remain a concern for the foreseeable future and will pose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that is likely to be
effective in meeting the threat. Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida and its affiliates have operated
in the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001,
have a predominantly tribal character or at least have
a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,
Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools to
counter Al-Qaida’s continuing presence in that social
environment, therefore, is a priority and requires understanding Al-Qaida’s critical vulnerabilities when it
operates in those societies and developing the means
to counter Al-Qaida’s efforts.
In particular, this monograph addresses the role of
tribal militias in the context of the fight against Al-Qaida. The intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify
options for future operations by focusing on past experience in order to identify the positive and negative
aspects related to the use of such militias.
The thesis is that the capabilities which triballybased militias provide may be one of the most efficient
and cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, such militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S.
Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground
in significant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias can reduce the size or preclude the need for a
U.S. commitment on the ground in environments that
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might present unfavorable conditions for a significant
U.S. Landpower footprint. At the same time, given the
complexity of the local political environment, tribal
militias are no panacea, but can be a two-edged sword
and, like any weapon, this weapon has to be understood and wielded with caution and skill in order to
avoid unintended consequences.
Terms of Reference and Methodology.
This monograph examines two models for tribal
militias, categorized on the basis of the nature of their
patron, since this is a key factor insofar as affecting
a patron’s interests, the patron-tribe relationship, AlQaida’s strategy, and the short- and long-term structure and the political and military functioning of tribal
militias. In Model 1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model 2, the national government is the
patron (although an outside patron may provide ancillary support). The intent of the analysis is to extract
lessons learned from which to craft recommendations
for the future that can facilitate the development of
effective policies and techniques by U.S. policymakers
for optimal use of assets in dealing with Al-Qaida. Of
course, every country in the Middle East has a unique
history and society, with a specific tribal social structure and role in the national political system, as well
as being subject to differences in the local geostrategic
environment. The focus here is on Iraq and Yemen.
However, many of the lessons learned may be applicable more broadly. Likewise, although the analysis
relies on data up to mid-2014 and future developments cannot be foreseen in detail, nevertheless these
general lessons learned should remain valid.
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The focus is on dealing with insurgent groups inspired by Al-Qaida, even if they are not always controlled by the traditional Al-Qaida leadership. In that
context, a clarification may be in order for the terms
identifying these organizations as used here. In Iraq,
the main jihadist organization has been through a
number of name changes since its appearance in that
country under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in 2003 as the Monotheism and Jihad Group (Jamaat
Al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad). The group was renamed AlQaida in Mesopotamia (Al-Qaida fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn)
in 2004 when Al-Zarqawi adhered formally to Usama
Bin Ladin as leader of Al-Qaida. In October 2006, the
Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al-Iraq Al-Islamiya, or ISI)
was proclaimed, although still maintaining at least
nominal loyalty to Al-Qaida’s central leadership.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, it was ISI that operated with delegated authority from Al-Qaida Central
(by that time led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri), in Syria beginning in January 2012 through its creation, Jabhat
Al-Nusra. However, the announcement by Abu Bakr
Al-Husayni Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi, head of ISI,
on April 9, 2013, to the effect that he was establishing
a joint Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Al-Dawla AlIslamiya fi Al-Iraq wa’l-Sham or ISIS), revealed openly
the sharp differences over command relationships between the two adjoining theaters and with Al-Qaida
Central’s leadership.1 Rejecting this initiative, Al-Zawahiri disowned the ISIS. With the beginning of Ramadan at the very end of June 2014, ISIS changed its
name once again when it proclaimed itself the Islamic
State (Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya), calling itself the RightlyGuided Caliphate (Al-Khilafa Al-Rashida). Nevertheless, despite Al-Zawahiri’s repudiation, Al-Baghdadi
has continued to lay claim to Bin Ladin’s mantle of
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leadership, and it may be a moot point as to which
of the two—Al-Zawahiri or Al-Baghdadi’s organization—now represents the Al-Qaida legacy.
Clearly, thanks to its success on the ground, ISIS
has gained momentum and widespread recognition
within Al-Qaida jihadist circles, and many prominent Al-Qaida figures now support it over a more
isolated and contained Al-Zawahiri. Moreover, apart
from Jabhat Al-Nusra’s own website, only one of the
traditional Al-Qaida websites—a key element in AlQaida’s political outreach, legitimacy, and command
and control system—still sides with Al-Zawahiri, as
all the others by mid-2014 recognized and supported
ISIS or, at best, remained silent on the split. In that
sense, ISIS is still “Al-Qaida,” whether Al-Zawahiri
recognizes it as such or not. In this study, depending
on the time period in question, the terms Al-Qaida/ISI
are used when dealing with the earlier phase and ISIS
when dealing with the more recent phase, although
for practical purposes, the discussion is applicable to
the broader Al-Qaida phenomenon.
In Yemen, the organization Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Qaida fi Al-Jazira Al-Arabiya) had resulted from the 2009 merger of Al-Qaida’s branches in
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Under that name, Al-Qaida
had already been battling against the Yemeni Army
for several years by the time the Arab Spring broke
out in Sanaa in early-2011. As was the case elsewhere
in the Arab World, a new organization—the Supporters of the Law (Ansar Al-Sharia)—also appeared in
Yemen although, even more clearly than elsewhere,
there was in practice little substantive change, as the
Ansar Al-Sharia were essentially part of Al-Qaida using a new name. In fact, very often it was impossible
even for the Yemenis to differentiate between the two
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names. In this monograph, the generic name Al-Qaida
will be used for the organization in Yemen.
Three case studies will serve as the database and
provide the context needed to understand the role of
the tribal militias and the other players. The first case
study deals with a Model 1 situation, where a foreign
patron—the United States—acted in that role in Iraq
from late-2006 through the December 2008-April 2009
period when responsibility was handed over to the
Iraqi authorities. The second case study deals with a
two Model 2 situation, again with Iraq, but in a Phase II,
after the national government’s assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in 2009. This case study is
especially useful for comparison with the earlier phase.
The third case study deals with Yemen, where the local
government has acted as the militia patron since 2012.
Of course, the Yemeni and the Iraqi situations are ongoing, with the potential for evolution, but the general
lines of development as identified here should provide
sufficient information for an appreciation of the militia
experience.2
Iraq and Yemen are both tribal societies, although
in different ways. Since the “retribalization” of society for political reasons under Saddam Hussein in the
1990s, tribes have become an increasingly significant
factor in Iraqi society, and even 80 percent of the urban population now is said to have a tribal allegiance.3
In Yemen, tribes are perhaps the dominant political
players in the country, and one can view even the
Yemeni government itself as tribally-based to a significant extent, relying on certain “in-tribes,” which is
reflected in the composition of the military, police, bureaucracy, and funding for specific tribal regions. Iraqi
tribal society is further complicated by sectarian and
ethnic divisions between Sunni and Shia Arabs and
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Sunni and Shia Kurds. Yemeni tribes, too, are divided
between Sunni and various branches of the Shia.
Not surprisingly, the militias raised in both Iraq
and Yemen to counter Al-Qaida have been essentially
tribally-based both in terms of organization and personnel. To be sure, at times their name may not designate them as being “tribal,” with the substitution
of a euphemism intended to suggest a more modern
organization rather than one based on a tribe, since a
tribal label may carry a stigma in international circles
or among local intellectuals. In Iraq, officially such militias have been known as the “Awakening” (Sahwa, or
the plural Sahwat)—as well as Sons of Iraq and other
names. However, the Iraqi media, in a nod to reality,
at times also uses the term “Tribal Sahwa” (Al-Sahwa
Al-Asha’iriya). In Yemen, the militias are most often
known as “Popular Committees” (Al-Lijan Al-Shabiya)
but here, again, the local media and participants are
not shy about using the term “Tribal Committees”
(Al-Lijan Al-Qabaliya).
Tribal militias do not exist in a vacuum: a country’s tribal fabric, the character of a government, and
Al-Qaida’s overall relationship with the tribes provide
the necessary background for understanding the tribal militias’ functioning. In fact, the local government
(or a foreign patron), the tribes, and Al-Qaida are all
active players with their own interests, objectives, and
strategies, and are forces that interact and seek to manipulate the other actors, thus forming an unstable triangular relationship. In this respect, it is particularly
important to appreciate the vulnerabilities that Al-Qaida faces in dealing with tribes in general, vulnerabilities that are an inherent dilemma for Al-Qaida, as the
latter is often caught between implementing its ideological and political program and dealing with social
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realities—and is a situation that is likely to generate
conflict, as will be seen in the succeeding case studies.
MODEL 1
The Iraqi Experience—Phase I.
The tribal militias which emerged in Iraq in 2006
illustrate the Model 1 version of tribal militias, with a
foreign entity, the United States, as the patron.
Developing the Sahwa.
Overall, the establishment and development of
the Sahwa tribal militias can be seen as the result of
a concurrence of interests in 2006 between a significant number of Sunni tribes and a foreign patron, the
United States, which one could consider at the time
the effective governing authority in the field in many
areas of Iraq. With an active insurgency putting AlQaida and a spectrum of other smaller groups against
the U.S. presence, the security situation—particularly
in the country’s Sunni areas—had reached a worrisome level that many found intractable. In order to
engage in the jihad, Al-Qaida/ISI, of necessity, had to
operate in the Sunni tribal milieu, which offered the
most likely potential foundation for its effort. At first,
Al-Qaida was able to make rapid inroads in the tribal
community in Iraq, feeding on resentment against
what was often viewed as an anti-Sunni and pro-Shia
U.S. occupation. It was not alone in that, as other antiU.S. militant groups representing disfranchised tribal
elements, often linked to the proscribed Bath Party
or the dissolved Iraqi military, also contributed to
the insurgency.
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Arguably, at the same time, Al-Qaida created its
own unique critical vulnerabilities in Iraq by alienating the tribes and making them amenable to cooperating with U.S. forces. While, to some extent, aspects of
Al-Qaida’s policy were attributable to its ideological
underpinnings of the organization as a whole, a more
important factor was how the branch operating in
Iraq chose to implement such principles in a range of
practical situations.
Under its then-leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the
local Al-Qaida clashed increasingly with tribal society
by seeking to impose a strict interpretation of Sharia,
or religious law, bolstered by religious courts handing down harsh sentences, in place of the traditional,
more flexible, tribal law. Among the consequences
of the enforcement of the Sharia were personal controls, such as banning music, shaving, and smoking,
and restricting the role of women in public, as well
as suppressing well-established elements of folk religion—such as invoking the intercession of saints or
celebrating Muhammad’s birthday (the mulid)—and
interfering with marriage traditions. The high visibility of foreigners among Al-Qaida’s leadership in Iraq,
and the shunting aside of local clerics, only served as
an additional irritant among the tribesmen, who are
traditionally suspicious of outsiders. The violation of
such tribal cultural values was felt as an unpardonable humiliation and, as one prominent shaykh, or
tribal chief, put it, Al-Qaida’s intent was to trample on
the tribes’ cherished values, that is to “do away with
social custom (urf ijtimai) . . . that was the real goal of
cutting off heads.”4
Al-Qaida also insisted on a monopoly of control
in the insurgency, either edging out or attacking competing armed groups, as well as being in the habit of
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launching indiscriminate attacks that often resulted
in numerous civilian casualties. And, Al-Qaida was
uncompromising: tribes had to choose sides—either
with Al-Qaida or with the United States. Recalcitrant
shaykhs were often assassinated.
However, it may have been, in particular, Al-Qaida’s negative impact on the tribes’ economic interests
was decisive in estranging both the tribal leadership
and ordinary tribesmen. Al-Qaida’s violence in AlAnbar and its growing control over the local society
crippled the local economy and made U.S. projects unlikely given the lack of security, thereby undercutting
the tribal shaykhs’ influence as they could no longer
broker economic benefits for their tribes. Al-Qaida also
competed at times for control over the lucrative trade
roads, a traditional source of some tribes’ income. In
the key case of Shaykh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha, who
eventually became the most prominent U.S. ally in AlAnbar province, a struggle with Al-Qaida for control
of the main supply route from Amman to Baghdad
pitted Al-Qaida against his tribe. Traditionally, Abu
Risha's tribe had supplied most of region’s truck drivers and may well have raided traffic and extorted
tolls. During this struggle with Al-Qaida, prominent
members of his family were killed.5 It was this turn
of events that induced Abd Al-Sattar to return from
Jordan in 2006 and to approach the United States to
join the fight against Al-Qaida.
Nevertheless, alone, the tribes—or the insurgent
groups that were often intertwined with the tribes—
realistically had been no match for Al-Qaida’s organization, zeal, and ability to mass mobile forces from
multiple locations against isolated tribes. Many tribes
were reluctant to confront Al-Qaida, even as increasing numbers of their fellow-tribesmen joined the latter,
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because of its supposed dominance. Only gradually
did the escalating disenchantment among tribesmen,
accompanied by the increasing realization that cooperation might be possible with U.S. forces, change
the environment.
U.S. policy had also evolved. At first, the United
States was indifferent or hostile to the Sunni tribes.
Because they were often tied to Saddam’s power
structure and were seen as part of a negative past,
American leaders were reluctant to take advantage of
a hospitable tribal terrain. Initially, as a former U.S.
military intelligence officer noted to a reporter:
[W]e couldn’t get the CPA [Coalition Provisional
Authority] to move . . . The standard answer we got
from [CPA Head L. Paul] Bremer’s people was that
the tribes were a vestige of the past, that they have no
place in the new democratic Iraq.6

By late-2005, U.S. forces on the ground were becoming more supportive of those tribes already in
conflict with Al-Qaida. At that time, elements of what
later coalesced into a general U.S. policy had already
proved successful when they were attempted on a localized scale. For example, in 2005, one Army officer
made an agreement with a local shaykh in return for
construction projects and within a few weeks, “What
had once been the most dangerous area in my zone
became one of the safest.”7
However, a strategic policy change from the American side emerged only in late-2006. At that time the
unfavorable facts on the ground catalyzed a U.S. policy
review leading to a revision in the counterinsurgency
approach.8 The key element of this revised approach
was a greater willingness to partner with the Sunni
tribes. These partnerships began initially in Al-Anbar
10

and subsequently also in other Sunni areas, leading to
the formation of a formal alliance in September 2006
between U.S. forces and a newly-established tribal
organization—the Sahwa.
The Patron-Client Relationship.
To make the Sahwa a reality, the United States provided a range of tangible rewards that benefited both
the shaykhs and ordinary tribesmen. These rewards
included clothing, food, and public services. What
was perhaps key were contracts to build or refurbish
military facilities, pumping stations, roads, schools,
clinics, and utility services, thanks to which, as one
shaykh noted, “We were able to put our people to
work.”9 Salaries for tribesmen serving in the Sahwa
were an especially important inducement. According
to one prominent shaykh, in just one section of Baghdad, the United States was supposedly paying $52
million a month on salaries to the Sahwa.10 Equally
important was the generous U.S. military assistance
to the Sahwa—as well as to the local police—in the
form of arms, ammunition, body armor, fuel, equipment, training, vehicles, and salaries for cooperating
shaykhs, allowing the latter to field an organized,
more or less full-time, military force under their control.11 The shaykhs could now claim credit for having
lifted the burden of Al-Qaida’s oppressive presence
from their fellow-tribesmen. At the same time, thanks
to the relationship with the United States, shaykhs
could strengthen their control over subordinates and
clients in their tribes through the power of patronage
and prestige. In fact, the United States, as a matter of
policy, would seek to strengthen the power of cooperative shaykhs by providing contracts to the latter or,
as one senior U.S. military officer was to note:
11

All of it [i.e., money] we funneled through the sheikhs.
. . . We empowered the sheikhs because there really
wasn’t a government functioning. . . . And we did all
we could to empower the sheikhs.12

Especially crucial as an enabling factor was the
personal security that U.S. forces now provided to
important individual shaykhs, which addressed a
key vulnerability that Al-Qaida had been able to target up to then. Earlier, by simply eliminating selected
shaykhs, Al-Qaida had been generally successful in
nipping tribal resistance movements in the bud. Now,
on the contrary, U.S. forces, for example, even sat outside the Abu Risha compound and residence for almost a year.13 While not fool-proof, the new personal
security regime afforded sufficient protection to convince shaykhs they could challenge Al-Qaida.
For the tribal shaykhs, the United States was the
ideal government, as it was a governing authority whose interest was primarily in security (and one
could argue that even the promotion of development
and providing services were tied to that primal interest) and which had little interest in interfering in
tribal affairs or in asking too many questions about a
shaykh’s economic dealings. There was limited oversight into how the shaykhs spent the money which
flowed from the United States. As a senior U.S. military officer operating in Al-Anbar noted:
[T]here’s a risk, because you’re going to give him
[i.e., a shaykh] money, and you’re not sure where the
money’s going to go, because it’s difficult for you to
get into that area, because of security, to ensure the
projects are being taken care of.14
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Tribal forces joined the Sahwa in large numbers,
and initiatives followed to replicate the Al-Anbar
experience elsewhere. In some provinces, the Sahwa
was set up considerably later, as in the case of Diyala,
where it took until October 2008 to do so formally.
Nevertheless, already by March 2008, the Sahwa nationwide numbered 91,000 personnel.
The Renewed War against Al-Qaida.
The establishment of the Sahwa—as the embodiment of the changed relationship with the tribes—was
a key element in the turnaround of the situation with
Al-Qaida, as it generated the large standing forces familiar with the local situation that could challenge AlQaida, at least with U.S. combat support. Conversely,
recruiting the Sahwa also removed a significant portion of the active or potential personnel pool involved
in the insurgency when they switched sides. In particular, the switching of allegiance by a shaykh could
have significant influence on the security of an area.
As Army Colonel Sean MacFarland noted of the situation in Al-Anbar, “Once a tribal leader flips, attacks on
American forces in that area stop almost overnight.”15
Of course, fielded U.S. military forces were also
crucial to operational success against Al-Qaida, providing vital capabilities that the Sahwa could not. As
a necessary complementary effort, U.S. forces (and
Iraqi forces under U.S. guidance) could, and did, engage Al-Qaida in significant conventional operations,
while also providing air and ground-based fires, force
protection, intelligence, planning, logistics, and information operations in support of the Sahwa effort.16 Essentially, by providing combat support and personal
security, U.S. forces made the area safe, providing the
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shield which enabled the Sahwa to wield its sword
against Al-Qaida at the level where it could make a
unique contribution.
U.S. strategy took advantage of the Sahwa’s
strengths: their knowledge of the local physical and
human terrain; their ability to identify and isolate suspected Al-Qaida members (whether outsiders or fellow-tribesmen); the presence of ready-made triballybased cohesion; collective responsibility (despite rifts
in ideological loyalties even within families); and the
permanence which made possible continuous control
of an area, taking away Al-Qaida’s mobility and initiative, so that it became very difficult for the latter to
operate without at least a tribe’s indifference. Equally
important was the Sahwa’s ability to find Al-Qaida
arms caches, the loss of which limited Al-Qaida’s ability to move at an operational level.
Sahwa operations against Al-Qaida often took the
form of struggles within individual tribes, pitting pro
and anti-Al-Qaida tribesmen against each other, as AlQaida had also recruited from within the tribes. In fact,
a local Sahwa commander noted that “most of those
we arrest or kill are from our own tribe.”17 Pitched battles were rare, though there were some fierce armed
engagements between Sahwa forces, often supported
by U.S. combat forces, and Al-Qaida. More frequently,
however, the dismantling of Al-Qaida’s structure took
the form of identifying and isolating operatives within
a tribe—a task which only their tribe was capable of
doing—and informing the authorities, turning them
over, or eliminating them directly. As part of the
anti-Al-Qaida fight, according to one shaykh, he had
personally reported to the authorities 130 members of
Al-Qaida from within his tribe, including an Al-Qaida
deputy commander and a minister in Al-Qaida’s ISI,
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which also suggests the depth to which Al-Qaida had
penetrated into the tribal fabric.18
Sahwa casualties in the war against Al-Qaida were
not negligible, with the Sahwa of Diyala province,
for example, suffering over 1,000 casualties fighting
against Al-Qaida.19 Sahwa leaders also paid a price,
as in the 2006-07 period alone, 28 prominent tribal
figures were killed.20
The Sahwa Experiment—A Resounding Success.
Using any measure of success, the results of the
Sahwa operations, in cooperation with Coalition forces, were impressive. In Al-Anbar, as General David
H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
noted, “A year ago the province was assessed as ‘lost’
politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when
local leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda.”21 Monthly attack levels in Al-Anbar had declined
from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in
August 2007 and, during the same period, 4,400 arms
caches had been discovered, some 1,700 more than
had been discovered in all of the preceding year.22
By the summer of 2007, Al-Anbar had been largely
secured, and Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha estimated
that there were only 200-300 Al-Qaida operatives left
in the province by November of that year.23 By early-2008, in Al-Anbar, the Coalition was able to begin
transitioning control to Iraqi forces.
Al-Qaida itself acknowledged not only that it had
suffered a bruising defeat, but also assessed that the
Sahwa had become its biggest threat. It even claimed
that the creation of the Sahwa had saved U.S. forces
from “a disaster.”24 As an adaptive organization, AlQaida Central sought to analyze what had gone wrong
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in Iraq, producing a comprehensive policy review in
late-2009/early-2010.25 So impressed was Al-Qaida
with the Sahwa that the document proposed to its
affiliate in Iraq a counter-Sahwa, however unrealistically, urging: “We call on the Islamic State of Iraq to establish jihadi Sahwa Councils.”26 (emphasis in the original).
Rather than railing against tribal loyalties as had earlier been the case, Al-Qaida now saw local tribal forces
who were protecting their homes and their folk—but
not necessarily commited to Al-Qaida’s beliefs—as
their best hope for control of an area. They saw that
“these tribal units draw their power from their local
environment, since they represent everyone in the area
which they are defending and protecting.”27 Although
modeled on the Sahwa, in Al-Qaida’s case, these units
were to have a jihadist orientation.
Al-Qaida’s intelligence chief, likewise, drafted a
paper in April 2012 dealing specifically with the Sahwa. He acknowledged that the Sahwa in Iraq “clearly
had an impact on the jihadist movement” and that the
Sahwa in general “is a new phenomenon for the followers of the jihadist movement, one with which they
had not been accustomed to dealing.”28 Both analyses
contained doctrinal guidelines for the future focused
largely on dealing with the population with a greater
degree of flexibility and realism in order not to alienate potential tribal supporters into being receptive to
a Sahwa in any theater.
The Case of Iraq: Phase II.
Barring a foreign patron’s unlikely intent to remain on the ground indefinitely or the eradication of
Al-Qaida, inherent in a Model 1 tribal militia, is an
inevitable Model 2, in which the local government
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now plays the role of patron, as was the case with the
Sahwa in Iraq. As part of the phased handover of responsibility for the Sahwa from U.S. forces over the
December 2008-April 2009 period, the identity of the
governing authority changed for the Sahwa from the
United States to that of a local player—the Iraqi government, with significant implications for the Sahwa’s
role and for the security situation in the country.
The Sahwa and the Iraqi Government:
A Rocky Relationship Benefits Al-Qaida.
A Clash of Political Cultures: Centralization vs.
Decentralization. The tribes’ quest for power and
autonomy, supported by their ready-made Sahwa
armed muscle, was bound to make any partnership
with the Iraqi state an uneasy one at best, and even
more so because of sectarian friction between the
tribes in the Sunni areas and the predominantly Shiabased central government and military. Realistically,
given the country’s political culture, any Iraqi state is
predisposed to centralize power and would look at a
phenomenon such as the Sahwa—or at the factor of
assertive tribes which lay behind the Sahwa militia—
with concern as an active or potential threat. This relationship would have been difficult even without the
presence of Al-Qaida, and the result has been an operational environment that is more favorable for AlQaida by engendering potential critical vulnerabilities
which the latter could exploit.
The Iraqi government was never comfortable
with how the Sahwa had been established and how
it functioned independently with the United States,
thereby sowing the seeds of mistrust from the start. A
Shia journalist, perhaps reflecting government views,
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expressed his misgivings about the Sahwa early. He
drew attention to the fact that the Sahwa’s creation
had bypassed the nascent Iraqi government in an
extralegal move and that arming Sunni tribes would
weaken the government in the long run.29 A press report, citing unnamed “sources close to the Iraqi government,” had called President George Bush’s visit to
the Sahwa leader Shaykh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha
in September 2007 “a not very friendly signal, which
contradicted protocol and embarrassed the politicians
who were brought in after midnight to meet with the
U.S. President in the strongholds of the tribal militias.”30 The Iraqi government was reportedly angry
that the U.S. Government had not even informed it
when an invitation had been extended to the Anbar
Sahwa leaders for a visit to the White House in 2007,
as the Iraqi Prime Minister’s adviser for tribal affairs,
Karim Bakhati, noted in a thinly veiled rebuke that
“one would have thought that [the invitation] would
have been sent through the Iraqi government,” and
concluded that “sending invitations in this manner
bypasses the authority of the central government.”31
The Sahwa expected to be treated as an equal player, alongside the government and the U.S. forces for,
as a leading shaykh in Al-Anbar stressed, “We are not
government employees.”32 At times, Prime Minister
Nuri Al-Maliki was interested in developing ties with
the Sunni tribes, as was the case before the March 2010
elections. That proved difficult, however, as shaykhs
in one meeting with his representative expressed
skepticism about his intentions. The fact that the meeting was also attended by U.S. military officers ensured
some civility, but the government representative’s assertion that “The Sahwa was imposed on us because
of the security situation” and his rhetorical question,
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“Does the Sahwa have any legal standing?” highlighted the lack of mutual trust.33 Mistrust continued
to set the tone for the government’s handling of the
Sahwa. When the author asked a senior Iraqi military
officer in 2012 about the current state of the Sahwa,
he replied “We didn’t want them,” and expressed resentment, saying that they were a drain on the Army’s
budget— “you force us to pay [them]”—and insisted
that the Sahwa personnel could not be absorbed into
the military.34
(Mis)Managing the Sahwa and the Sunni Tribes.
To make matters worse, the Iraqi government mismanaged its dealings with the Sahwa and with the
Sunni tribes in general after the U.S. handover. It tried
to marginalize the Sahwa, thereby alienating many
shaykhs and tribesmen and helping to create a more
favorable operational environment for Al-Qaida. The
result was a reduction of the Sahwa’s force structure
and a degradation of its capabilities.
Interruptions and irritations connected with
pay (now handled by the Army) alienated fighters
throughout the system and made them more receptive to blandishments by Al-Qaida. In some cases, as
in Diyala, pay to 4,500 Sahwa fighters was interrupted
for more than a year.35 Some Sahwa fighters simply
walked off the job to protest late pay, such as those
who abandoned their checkpoints in Diyala.36 Pay issues at times became so exasperating that Sahwa personnel in Baghdad threatened to rejoin Al-Qaida if
the situation did not improve.37 A former Sahwa commander from Ramadi complained that:
What has been offered to the fighters in Al-Anbar up
to the present has been paltry in comparison to the
sacrifices they have made. Those who were wounded

19

or even permanently disabled fighting Al-Qaida do
not have medical care.

He taxed government promises made in public as
“electoral propaganda” and pointed to the “very low”
pay of 120,000 dinars ($102) per month for Sahwa personnel, categorizing that as “sad.”38 Insufficient funding also affected operational readiness, as the commander of the Sahwa in Samarra complained in 2010
that “Ever since the transfer of responsibility to the
Iraqi government, we have been suffering from a lack
of support. . . . We are now obliged to buy our own
weapons and ammunition.”39
Allegations of government harassment, ranging
from gratuitous harassment and humiliation on pay
day to widespread arrests of prominent tribal shaykhs
for crimes allegedly committed during the fighting
against Al-Qaida, also generated anxiety and dissatisfaction among Sahwa personnel and within the
Sunni tribes in general.40 In Salah Al-Din province,
Sahwa members accused the central security forces of
stopping them routinely and accusing them of having
belonged to Al-Qaida in the past.41 Rumors of more
forthcoming outstanding warrants for past activities—
when many Sahwa personnel had been part of the insurgency—prompted hundreds of Sahwa fighters in
Diyala province to abandon their posts, with one local
Sahwa commander concluding that such unfounded
arrests were just being used as “a weapon to eliminate
the Sahwa.”42
Another source of considerable resentment within
the Sahwa and the Sunni tribes has been a perception
that the government was not doing enough—or even
cared—about the security of Sahwa personnel and
their families. Al-Qaida, for its part, made the elimi-
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nation of Sahwa commanders a priority. The government’s decision to end the salaries of the Sahwa leaders’ bodyguards in 2010 was a very risky move, as it
increased the shaykhs’ already high vulnerability to
assassination attempts as the threats from Al-Qaida
increased, thereby putting the entire Sahwa structure in jeopardy. The government relented only with
reluctance, in an effort to retain the loyalty of tribal
leaders, but agreed only to a palliative solution: they
increased the shaykhs’ salaries and paid for just three
bodyguards for each Sahwa commander.43
Mishandling the Demobilization and Integration
of the Sahwa. The government was especially wary
that the Sahwa not become a parallel Sunni armed
force, but the clumsy demobilization effort only further fueled discontent within the tribes. As part of
the handover, Al-Maliki had expressed his concern
at a press conference that the government needed to
ensure it had a monopoly over armed force and announced it would limit Sahwa powers of arrest, while
expressing the need “to close out the Sahwa file.”44
In contrast, Iraq’s tribal leaders expected to continue
playing a significant political role, believing they
represent a dominant sector of society. The Sahwa’s
representative, Shaykh Thamir Al-Tamimi, posited
that the Sahwa should be maintained as long as there
was a security threat in the country, including from
Shia and Kurdish militias—in effect, putting off the
Sahwa’s disbandment into the distant future.45 The
government’s announced intention to disarm the
Sahwa fighters and to limit gun permits was also unsettling, especially in light of the integral gun culture
of tribal life. As one Sahwa leader, Shaykh Ali Hatim,
noted defiantly:
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We will not hand over our weapons . . . why should
we hand them over? Is that not part of my worldview,
just like I have my religion so also I have my weapons.
That is, I believe that weapons are a part of who I am.46

Clearly, the Shia-based military and security forces
did not favor absorbing Sunnis from the Sahwa. Soon
disagreements surfaced as to what had been agreed,
with the government spokesman reiterating that it
had approved the integration of only 20 percent of
the Sahwa fighters into the security services, while the
Sahwa’s advisor was adamant that the government
had agreed to absorb all Sahwa fighters who met the
requirements, while those who did not would be given government jobs elsewhere.47 Government spokesmen, in veiled warnings, continued to emphasize that
the Sahwa was set up without the government’s approval and that it could, if it desired, “suppress the
Sahwa account without fear,” even if it had not done
so up to now.48
Those Sahwa members who were integrated into
the government sector were often dissatisfied with
their experience. Members of the Sahwa preferred
security jobs rather than those in the civil side of the
government, which usually paid less.49 As one former Sahwa fighter complained, despite having faced
great dangers in the fight against Al-Qaida, “we are
surprised by . . . the jobs [we received], which are not
appropriate to our dignity and our capabilities . . .
such as in the sanitation or agricultural components
of the state sector.”50 Other jobs were also temporary
at best and, reportedly, the civilian government sector even discharged many Sahwa fighters it had hired
originally, citing their lack of qualifications.51
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Sahwa forces became progressively depleted, not
only by partial integration into the government sector
but also by outright release and the voluntary departure of disillusioned fighters. From a peak of 118,000
Sahwa personnel in April 2009 (although there may
also have been additional unofficial fighters), by October 2010 only some 52,000 fighters remained on the
official rolls.52 Eventually, the Sahwa was allowed to
wither away in all but name due to government neglect, with a reported 30,000 members by early 2013,
although the actual number of those present for duty—
and demoralized and resentful fighters at that—was
probably even considerably lower.53
Al-Qaida’s Rebuilding Effort.
As noted earlier, Al-Qaida’s reassessment in the
wake of defeat led it to modify, at least in part, its policies to remove some of the irritants that had turned
the Sunni tribes against it and had enabled the Sahwa.
As part of a new carrot-and-stick policy, Al-Qaida
continued to attack Sahwa commanders, while it reduced its direct economic competition with the tribal
leaders. Al-Qaida shifted its revenue collection from
trying to control convoys through tribal territory to
collecting from urban end-point merchants. Al-Qaida
also began accepting neutral tribes, reduced leadership roles for foreign jihadists, and placed less focus
on enforcing strict Sharia. Finally they expressed an
intent to avoid civilian casualties, and showed greater
willingness to work within the tribal hierarchy instead
of seeking to overturn it.
These efforts combined with the Iraqi government’s hostility and neglect toward the tribes and
the Sahwa gradually allowed Al-Qaida to regain its
former influence in the tribal areas. In particular, Al23

Qaida had an opportunity to draw away disillusioned
Sahwa fighters by offering material incentives, and
one Sahwa commander in Bayji warned that “AlQaida is spending large sums of money in order to
attract back Sahwa members.”54 In the northern part
of the Baghdad region and in Diyala, some 15 percent
of the Sahwa fighters were said to have reverted to ISI
by late 2010.55 One Sahwa commander urged the government to rehire the Sahwa veterans who had been
dismissed, with the specific purpose of preventing ISI
from recruiting them again.56
Thanks to the mounting hostility against the government, ISI penetrated some Sahwa units, especially
as many former ISI members had joined the Sahwa
as a refuge after the U.S. victories. In the Abu Ghraib
area, so great was the official mistrust of the Sahwa
that the security forces refused to share intelligence
with the local Sahwa.57 In Diyala, some fighters serving in the Sahwa simply stopped cooperating with
the authorities; according to the province’s security
forces commander, “They are not telling us if Al Qaeda is in the area. They are not warning us . . . A lot
of them are definitely helping the insurgents.”58 In at
least some instances, even before the U.S. withdrawal,
the local Sahwa might cooperate with U.S. forces during the daytime, but then there would still be gunfire
and rockets directed at U.S. bases at night, indicating that the Sahwa at the very least was not always
reacting forcefully to the ISI presence, if not actually
cooperating with the latter, as a way of hedging its
bets.59 Over time, Al-Qaida was able to rebuild its
presence in many Sunni areas, reestablishing camps,
continuing its harassment attacks against recalcitrant
Sahwa commanders and mounting small-scale operations—and the occasional spectacular one—against
government targets.
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Tribal Revolt, the ISIS Onslaught,
and Rehabilitating the Sahwa.
By 2010, general dissatisfaction had mounted in
the wake of the continuing deterioration of the economic situation and the growing resentment in the
Sunni areas thanks to government neglect and political marginalization. Even an individual in Al-Ramadi
who had suffered earlier at the hands of Al-Qaida
now complained. His comments reflect a general disgruntlement with the status quo:
Everything has turned sour for us now. There are no
services; we don’t have jobs; poverty is killing us.
What are they waiting for? Do they want us to beg
in the streets so that we can live? Is that what they’re
waiting for?

And, he warned, “By God, if there is no change blood
will flow ankle-deep and violence and killing will return once again to this province.”60
The excessive use of force in a government crackdown against protesters in Al-Anbar in December
2013 catalyzed an open rebellion by many of the Sunni tribes, whose fighters soon named themselves the
“tribal insurgents.” Although violence increased in
most Sunni areas, the epicenter of the dissidence was
in Al-Anbar province.
Sunni—often Bathist-based or nationalist-religious—insurgent groups reemerged. More importantly, the recently-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), as the continuation of Al-Qaida in
Iraq—but now, as noted earlier, a dissident offshoot
from the traditional central Al-Qaida leadership—also
exploited the situation to make a spectacular comeback. Although the Sahwa may have been willing to
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oppose ISIS—even if not out of love for the government—some tribes now saw also ISIS as a useful, if
distasteful, ally against an even more distasteful central government, while still other tribes remained
neutral.61 The government even accused some in the
Sahwa, such as in Babil, of being passive “spectators
collecting salaries.”62 ISIS, for its part, tried to deter
tribesmen from participating in the Sahwa by decapitating or hanging the Sahwa fighters it captured,
They also took reprisals against the families of Sahwa
commanders. Many Sunnis, in fact, have continued to
see ISIS as a counterweight to a hostile government
or to Shia militias (or even to Kurdish forces in certain areas), a factor that ISIS has stressed, thus making
the Arab tribes more willing to cooperate with ISIS.63
(See Figure 1.)
Benefiting from the combat experience and equipment acquired fighting against the Asad regime in
neighboring Syria, ISIS (known in the local sources by
its Arabic acronym DAISH) was able to transfer some
forces from the latter and to take advantage of Sunni
discontent with the central government and of the
Iraqi Army’s critical vulnerabilities. In the campaign
that unfolded, ISIS was able rapidly to take many of
the towns in Al-Anbar as well as in other provinces
and, in the process, to cause significant casualties and
embarrassing defeats to the country’s security forces.
As the security situation worsened, a beleaguered
government hurriedly tried to reconstitute the depleted Sahwa, relying on Al-Anbar’s fragmented
system of tribal rivalries to find support against ISIS
even if only among part of the population. Baghdad
quadrupled Sahwa salaries to $430 a month for fighters in May 2013 and, the following month, allocated
$130 million to finance the Sahwa through the rest of
the year.64
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Note: Figure 1 denotes an ISIS cartoon reminding Iraqis they
need it (ISIS) for protection against the government. Local resident earlier telling ISI fighter to leave, but later regretting that
now the area was at the mercy of the Iraqi government. Frame 1:
“All of you leave our hamlet. It’s our hamlet and we will defend
it.” Frame 2: “Help! The mujahidin have left and are allowing the
government to butcher us!”
Source: Al-Minbar Al-Ilami Al-Jihadi Al-Qaida website, January
2014.

Figure 1. ISIS Cartoon.
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In a 2013 recruitment campaign 10,000 new personnel, eventually rising to 16,000, were added to the Sahwa rolls.65 The government also began to provide help
with organization, logistics, equipment, and arms.66
Some tribes, however, continued to hedge their bets,
with their fighters working in the Sahwa during the
daytime and with the insurgents at night.67
However, no doubt concerned about creating a
future threat, the government remained reluctant to
establish Sahwa maneuver units, despite requests
for that, preferring the Sahwa to continue operating
as small groups.68 In an effort to try to consolidate
command and control, and playing on tribal and
personal rivalries, the government engineered the replacement in February 2013 of long-time Sahwa commander Ahmad Abu Risha by Wisam Al-Hardan, a
tribal shaykh with fewer connections in the Gulf, who
was seen as more cooperative with the government.
By early-2014, the security situation had deteriorated
further, and the government felt it necessary to increase the inducements to the Sahwa, promising $1
billion for reconstruction in Al-Anbar (although some
estimates placed the amount of damage in Al-Anbar
at $20 billion by May 2014), the future absorption of
10,000 Sahwa personnel into the security forces, and
increased operational support in the form of air power
and artillery.69
However, in the new operational and political
environment, the Sahwa’s success is less likely than
when the Americans had been in charge. Currently,
the Sahwa is no match in the field for the reenergized Al-Qaida with its recently-developed combat
capabilities.
Relying on advanced weaponry (seized from Syrian Army arsenals or funneled to the anti-Asad rebels
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by foreign countries) and combat experience gained in
Syria, in both urban terrain and conventional operations, they have developed effective maneuver units
that use both mobility and surprise. These units’ operations are backed by solid intelligence, well-developed psychological operations skills, solid plans targeting the adversary’s weak points, flexible logistics,
and even combat engineers. Thanks to these strengths,
ISIS forces have continually out maneuvered and outfought the Iraqi Army.
The Iraqi Army—plagued by faulty planning,
lackluster and corrupt leaders, inadequate training,
poor intelligence, neglect of the troops’ basic needs,
and inexperience in urban combat—was hard-pressed
survive, much less to cooperate effectively with the
Sahwa in meeting the ISIS challenge. Often, the Army
was unable to seize and hold terrain, and usually resorted to inaccurate shelling and airstrikes along with
other heavy-handed behavior that caused civilian casualties and damage that served as a further cause for
Sunni discontent.70 Some critics contended that some
Army commanders were still reluctant to operate with
the Sahwa due to sectarian bias, while Baghdad’s officials in Al-Anbar in late 2013 had actually opposed
expanding the Sahwa.71
Army casualties mounted, which some unconfirmed Iraqi security reports placed at over 6,000 dead
and wounded by May 2014, out of 28,000 engaged in
combat.72 By then, Sahwa commanders could only
travel to Baghdad by air due to the insecure roads.
Morale was becoming a significant problem, leading
to desertions, with an Iraqi security source reporting
a 30 percent failure to return to the front after home
leave, requiring replacements to be deployed from
other parts of the country.73 By mid-June 2014, the

29

Army in many areas had literally disintegrated in the
face of a far smaller enemy, abandoning its equipment
and fleeing, even—as in the case of Mosul—before ISIS
attacked. Over 500 senior Army officers were said to
have fled to neighboring Kurdish territory dressed in
civilian clothes.74 Notwithstanding continuing rosy
situation reports from the government as well as the
Army calling the retreat from Al-Anbar only “a tactical withdrawal,” it was hard to argue that a small
ISIS contingent had routed a much larger Army force
and that it had seized sizeable swathes of territory,
including many cities. In their advance, ISIS also acquired additional weapons (including the arsenal of
the disintegrated 3rd Division), money seized from
banks, and freed detained jihadis. They also sought
to establish control over dams and water supplies as
well as oil facilities, in order to exercise greater power
over the tribal areas in addition to an advantage on
the battlefield.
Assessing Iraq’s Phase II.
Iraq’s Phase II, with the Baghdad government
in control of the Sahwa, highlighted some enduring
problems with the Sahwa model. Clearly, the handling of the Sahwa was far less effective that when the
United States had been the Sahwa’s patron. In general
terms, Baghdad paid the price of neglecting the Sahwa
against a background of alienating the parent tribes,
something that could not be undone quickly or easily. On the one hand, the political interests—exacerbated by sectarian differences—of the Sahwa and of
Baghdad, as the country’s national government, were
bound to clash in a way that was not the case with the
United States, which operated on a short-term hori-
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zon and did not feel threatened by the autonomy and
sectarianism of the Sahwa and its parent tribes.
In operational terms, the Sahwa was often misused. Lacking numbers (and no doubt reluctant to
take heavy casualties), the Army at one point was considering sending in the Sahwa and police to retake AlFalluja, although they were likely to be outmatched
by a defending veteran Al-Qaida force.75 Such militias cannot be considered a stand-alone maneuver
element. Lacking as they do the necessary training
and weaponry, they would likely be outgunned and
outperformed by a proficient combat force such as
Al-Qaida had become. The Sahwa is most effective in
small-scale anti-guerrilla engagements and as a security force for consolidation operations. The Sahwa operates optimally with a regular force that can provide
it with effective support in functions such as fires, logistics, command and control, and mobility, support
which the Iraqi Army only slowly acknowledged as
desirable but became unable to provide.
Nevertheless, even as late as mid-2014, the conditions that had provided the favorable background for
the United States to develop the Sahwa were still in
evidence. In its rapid advance with relatively small
forces, ISIS had not consolidated its control over territory, often bypassing areas of secondary importance
or those where tribes put up a stiff resistance. Also,
as earlier, ISIS has been in an uneasy coalition with
Bathist ex-officers, tribal insurgents, national-religious
and moderate jihadists—allies who had joined recently as ISIS’s success became apparent and, as before,
friction soon arose among these disparate groups.
Moreover, ISIS was still bent on imposing strict religious law (including banning soccer, burning down
beauty salons, and enforcing modest clothing), as
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well as demolishing saints’ shrines, pressuring local
women into marriage, and executing perceived opponents.76 As late as June 2014, prominent Sunni tribal
shaykhs and mainstream clerics expressed a willingness to work with the government against ISIS provided Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki stepped down.77
Resistance to ISIS by tribal forces, often raised on local
initiative, continued in cooperation with the remnants
of security forces in the field in mid-2014.78 ISIS itself
continues to view the Sahwa as a threat and has created special anti-Sahwa units, the “Sahwa Hunters.”
(See Figure 2.)

Source: An ISIS anti-Sahwa unit in Iraq’s Kirkuk province, May
2014, available from Al-Minbar Al-Ilami Al-Jihadi, an Al-Qaida
website.

Figure 2. “The Sahwa Hunters.”
Although the possibility of mobilizing tribal militias continued to exist, the government appeared
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unwilling to adopt that option. Sunni tribal militias
persisted in requesting arms, financial, logistic, and
operational support from the government, into mid2014, but little was forthcoming.79 Tribal militiamen in
Al-Anbar, for example, complained in late June-2014
that they received no guidance or weapons or other
support from the Army, which they accused of withdrawing and abandoning them to face ISIS alone.80
When the government did encourage new tribal
militias, as the ISIS threat approached the Shia heartland, the focus was mainly among the Shia tribes in
central and southern Iraq, with a smattering of Sunni
tribes in mixed areas. While some Shia militias continued to be organized within party and religious brotherhood structures, the Shia response was now along
tribal lines. It is claimed that 250,000 have volunteered
for service, especially after the senior Shia cleric,
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, issued a fatwa in June
2014 designating such service as a religious duty.81
Each tribe established a volunteer recruitment center,
while in Baghdad, tribal meeting houses served as
mustering centers for the new militiamen coming from
outside the capital.82 The outpouring of Shia support,
and the Shia Sahwa’s promises that it would operate
in and retake largely-Sunni areas such as Mosul and
Salah Al-Din province, along with Prime Minister AlMaliki’s declarations that he would liberate Al-Anbar,
no doubt only alienated many Sunnis further.
Conversely, with increased government dependence on tribal fighters in the Shia community, demands for enhanced political power quickly also
emerged among the newly-established Shia Sahwa.
In turn, the tribal Sahwa in the Basra area demanded
the creation of a stand-alone ministry for a “National
Guard,” which may make Prime Minister Al-Maliki
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uncomfortable.83 Moreover, government talk of incorporating the new volunteers into the Army—albeit as
distinct units—was met within the Army with little
enthusiasm, as it assessed the often over-age, out-ofshape, and untrained manpower pool as unsuitable
for conventional military operations.84
As of mid-2014, although the situation remained
fluid, Baghdad indicated that the government would
no longer prioritize building a more effective relationship with the Sunni community or the Sunni Sahwa.
They believed these efforts would entail a significant
restructuring of the current Iraqi political system and a
devolution of some powers from the center to the parent Sunni tribal areas. While Prime Minister Al-Maliki
could try to reverse the major defeats suffered on the
ground with a renewed military effort buttressed
by the help of foreign advice and support, it is more
likely that he may decide to focus instead on the Shia
core areas, which contain both the bulk of Iraq’s oil reserves and the only outlet to the sea, and which would
enable him to consolidate his own power, rather than
working to secure all or parts of majority-Sunni areas
to the north of Baghdad for strategic reasons.85 Even
in case of the country’s de facto partition, significant
instability and conflict are likely to persist for years,
especially with no clearly defined borders and many
mixed and disputed areas. This is even more likely
because ISIS has become overconfident, imbued with
“victory fever” pursuing maximalist goals. However,
even if, as seems likely, the Baghdad government has
squandered its opportunity to work with a Sunni tribal
militia movement to counter the ISIS, that failure does
not invalidate the potential utility and even necessity
of developing and using such a capability in dealing
with Al-Qaida and its offshoots.
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MODEL 2
The Case of Yemen.
Al-Qaida and the Arab Spring in Yemen.
The tribal militias that emerged in Yemen in the
wake of the Arab Spring represent a Model 2 situation.
That is, these militias have been the product of local
initiative from the very first, with the Yemeni government acting as the managing patron of the militias established to fight Al-Qaida. These militias have been
de facto tribally-based militias, recruited and deployed
as tribal units, and used most often (although not exclusively) on their own tribal territory.
The Arab Spring in Yemen, more so than in other
countries, was not so much a protest movement in favor of reform but, more a struggle for power between
the ruling regime and competing forces that were often similar in outlook but differed in their tribal, regional, or religious affiliation, and were buttressed by
personal ambitions. In relation to Al-Qaida, the Arab
Spring set in motion events that eventually led to the
downfall of the country’s long-standing ruler, President Ali Abd Allah Salih. This was accompanied by
the disruption of the established—if rickety—domestic balance of forces.
In Yemen, up to the beginning of the Arab Spring,
Al-Qaida had engaged mostly in a low-level guerilla
war using the typical insurgent tactic of hit-and-run
attacks. By late-spring 2011, the advent of the Arab
Spring, along with a concurrent challenge from the
Shia Houthi rebel movement in the north, had a paralyzing effect on Yemen’s government and military.
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These circumstances apparently induced Al-Qaida to
calculate that the time had come to escalate its operational goals and change its objective to one of setting
up a state. As even a low-level Al-Qaida operative saw
it, “We benefited from these revolutions. They gave us
maneuver space. We were able to come out. . . . We
were able to tell people about our mission.”86
Al-Qaida now escalated its activities and began to
carry out increasingly large-scale operations, leading
at times to engagements involving large units, and
often embarrassing the Yemeni Army and inflicting
heavy casualties. In particular, Al-Qaida decided to
concentrate its effort on where it could bring its greatest power to bear, namely in the Sunni tribal areas of
the southern part of the country, where it had already
been operating with mixed results and where there
was an inherent mistrust of and sense of neglect at
the hands of the government. For example, in Abyan
province, the focus of its expanded activity, Al-Qaida
reportedly was able to mass some 2,000 fighters by
June 2011.87
In fact, boasting of having captured artillery, air
defense guns, and tanks from the Army, Al-Qaida in
September 2011 proclaimed in its official bulletin “the
completion of the attrition phase against the Army.”
They meant that the first phase of the three-phase
Maoist-based insurgency program which Al-Qaida
had long internalized had been concluded, and that it
was now appropriate to move up to the second, more
advanced, phase of insurgency.88 Al-Qaida also decided to expand its activity on the ground by seizing
and holding terrain. True, Al-Qaida ran into tribal resistance in Dali province, an area that had long been a
stronghold of leftist sentiment.89 However, elsewhere,
thanks to the weakened government and a reduced
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security presence, Al-Qaida was able to establish control in several towns during 2011, including Zunjubar,
Jaar, Lawdar, and Shaqra in Abyan province, Rida in
Al-Bayda’ province, and Azzan in Shabwa Province.
They even planned to advance on Aden itself, the
largest city in the South.
Al-Qaida: Establishing a State and Creating Its Own
Critical Vulnerabilities.
Al-Qaida saw the opportunity to establish quickly the nucleus of an Islamic state in Yemen. In fact,
buoyed by its initial success, Al-Qaida now boldly
and repeatedly proclaimed in its official bulletin that
in the territories it controlled in the South, “we have
laid down the first foundation on which to build the
Caliphate.”90
Al-Qaida’s hasty expansion, however, may have
been responsible for the rapid growth of the tribal
committees that was to follow, as Al-Qaida’s new
prominence and the exercise of power in the towns
it controlled generated tension with the tribal leadership.91 In part, many tribes feared retaliation by the
Yemeni military and by U.S. airstrikes for any Al-Qaida presence in their areas, a factor of which Al-Qaida
was acutely sensitive. As its legal representative acknowledged, one reason Al-Qaida felt it was unable to
spread further in Yemen was because the local population was afraid that it would attract air strikes.92
Despite the popularity of the social services and
security that Al-Qaida introduced, the cost was clearly
high. This was especially true in terms of Al-Qaida’s
enforcement of its vision of an Islamic society, which
often led it to come into conflict with the local population. As long as it had military superiority in an

37

area, Al-Qaida was able to impose its harsh model
of society. Special attention was devoted to “Islamizing” the educational system, and the sexes were now
strictly separated in schools. In the town of Azzan,
music was forbidden in public areas, shop owners
were told to grow beards, women were not permitted
to work outside the home, and television and magazines were banned.93 In one town, Al-Qaida attacked a
wedding party and smashed the musical instruments
being used in the festivities.94 Al-Qaida also cracked
down on alcohol and drugs, imposing harsh Islamic
penalties, as was the case of a hashish user who was
flogged.95
Al-Qaida, also sought to stamp out what it calls
“sorcery” and “deviance,” catch-all terms for what
are in reality deeply-entrenched features of traditional folk religion. In Yemen’s case, such practices as
the veneration of saints and their tombs and of living
holy men as the medium of intercession, mystical sufi
brotherhoods, talismans, curses, incantations, and fortune tellers are widespread. In fact, Al-Qaida, while
in power, was proud to announce initiatives such as
their arrest of a “sorcerer” in one town, and it resumed
the campaign with the August 2013 declaration of
war against sorcerers and their pursuit, especially in
Hadramawt province.96 However, at times, Al-Qaida
met with spontaneous resistance, as in the case of the
attempt to suppress one “sorcerer” in Rida, which led
to a lethal shootout between the latter’s followers and
Al-Qaida personnel.97
More generally, the rapid imposition of the Sharia
to replace the more flexible and familiar traditional
tribal law also created more than its share of friction
with the tribesmen subjected to it.98 No doubt tribal
leaders often saw Al-Qaida’s presence as a direct chal-
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lenge to own their authority within their tribe, not
least with the replacement of tribal law (in which the
tribal shaykh and notables would have considerable
influence and which would be a source of power and
material gain for the tribal notables) by the Sharia. As
Al-Qaida’s Amir, or leader, in Abyan province, Jalal
Al-Marqashi, acknowledged, his organization had
tried to negotiate an agreement in one town with the
local Popular Committees, but the stumbling block
was Al-Qaida’s insistence on the implementation of
the Sharia, which the Popular Committees had rejected categorically, asserting “We cannot apply the
Sharia in the town!!”99 Local people reportedly also
grumbled that punishments were handed out arbitrarily, without adequate investigations.100 Even some
of their initial supporters were said to have become
disillusioned by the harshness of Al-Qaida’s rule.101
Establishing the Popular Committees.
The Yemeni Army had already experimented with
tribal militias in the South even before the country’s
new government came to power. The concept that had
been pioneered by the Egyptian Army to fight against
the ousted Yemeni royalists after the 1962 Revolution was revived more recently in the government’s
fight against the Shia Houthi movement in northern
Yemen. It was a military factional leader, Staff Major
General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, then commander of
the now-dissolved 1st Armored Division, who deployed Army units under his command into Abyan
province and organized the official Popular Committees there in June 2011, although the committees he
supported haphazardly were unsuccessful in the fight
against Al-Qaida.102
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To fill the vacuum resulting from the paralysis of
the government as protests mounted in the capital
against President Salih, some local leaders had also
began to establish Committees in mid-2011, largely
to regulate prices for staples or the distribution of essentials such as propane.103 At first, such spontaneous
Committees often cooperated with Al-Qaida, as when
the latter took the city of Jaar from the Army in 2011,
but soon disputes emerged.104
However, with encouragement and money from
the new government, additional official Committees
were now set up, often by government order, and
many tribal leaders in Abyan and Shabwa provinces
were quick to respond, with the specific intent of countering Al-Qaida. Tribes in Yemen are traditionally already well-armed, not only with personal weapons
and rocket propelled grenades, but also with crewserved systems such as armor, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, and truck-mounted anti-aircraft
guns used in a ground mode. However, in operational
terms, the tribes on their own, isolated in their narrow arena, found it hard to compete militarily with
Al-Qaida. The latter enjoyed the same advantages of
familiarity with the local terrain, but also had the ability to move and mass over wider territories, thanks
to a cohesive force structure. They even had gained
artillery after their initial defeats of the Yemeni Army.
Perhaps the key inducement from the government
side was the money that the latter provided to the Popular Committees. The shaykhs commanding the Committees became the conduit for the salaries and now,
once again, it was the tribal shaykhs and notables who
settled disputes among their fellow-tribesmen, rather
than Al-Qaida’s Sharia officials, thus restoring their
usurped authority and providing them with addi-
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tional political and financial resources.105 For ordinary
tribal fighters, the new salary—ranging from $60 to
$150 a month, depending on the locality, plus food—is
a princely sum in a country where that is equal to the
average salary for a teacher and where over 54 percent
of the population lives in poverty on less than $2 per
day. In a country where unemployment is rampant,
it is not surprising that most of the Committee fighters were drawn from the unemployed youth, often no
more than boys.106
With the implicit delegation of control of an area
to Committees and the absence of a government presence, the temptation also increased for the Committees to take advantage for their own benefit. There
were complaints of arbitrary arrests, punishments,
and executions, including the fatal flogging of one
Army soldier they arrested for drinking.107 According
to one of the founders of the Committees in Abyan,
the local population began to call Committee members “thieves and highway robbers” after the latter
looted government property when Al-Qaida left in
2012. Committee members have often been accused of
extorting money from truckers and merchants, which
was made easier after they had expelled two battalions of national police from the province.108 The lure of
plunder may also be an inducement to recruitment, as
illustrated by the dispute that arose between the local
government in one district and the Committees over
the division of vehicles and weapons captured from
Al-Qaida, while in other instances the Army and the
Committees exchange mutual recriminations over the
looting of refugees’ houses.109
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Taking the Fight to Al-Qaida.
In many ways, the situation in a number of tribal
areas was ripe for a confrontation with Al-Qaida, but
it was only with the establishment of a modicum of
political stability at the center after Salih had been
replaced by his deputy, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi,
in February 2012, that the central government was finally able to redirect more of its military and security
forces to the areas affected by Al-Qaida and to make it
feasible for the tribes to challenge Al-Qaida.
The Yemeni Army clearly has had a need for the
Committees, as it is as much a political as it is a military actor. Not only is the Army the regime’s principal
mainstay but also, at the same time, it is a potential
threat. It is rife with factional fragmentation that reflect rivalries for power and funding, often pitting its
commanders against each other and the President.
This results in a diminution of the Army’s fighting effectiveness as military commanders at all levels are often working at cross-purposes with their peers. What
is more, the Yemeni military has long fielded fewer
forces than it carries on paper. One source reported
that instead of the claimed strength of 450,000 soldiers
there were only 150,000 on active duty. A case in point
is the 111th Brigade which had only 600 men present for duty instead of the authorized 3,000.110 This
chronic manpower shortage has made it difficult to
deal decisively with Al-Qaida. Also, the Army has not
always been able to consolidate its gains. Instead, it
has to withdraw forces from one area in order to deal
with challenges elsewhere. This means that to move
against a dissident tribe or the Shia Houthis in the
North, it must walk away from problems with pro-
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separatists in the South. For example, despite appeals
from tribal leaders in late-2013 that the Army retain
its presence in order to provide security in Al-Mahfad
district in Abyan province, the units in question had to
be withdrawn in order to reinforce the understrength
111th Brigade and the 2nd Brigade of the Republican
Guard, leaving the original area more vulnerable to
Al-Qaida.111
The 2012 “GOLDEN SWORDS” Campaign.
In Operation GOLDEN SWORDS, the campaign
conducted during the spring and summer of 2012,
the Yemeni military and security forces were able to
deal Al-Qaida a serious defeat and to erase virtually
all its recent gains.112 U.S. support and, in particular,
airpower, played a key role in some instances. For example, according to Yemeni sources, U.S. drones were
instrumental in the retaking of the town of Jaar, where
they were successful in targeting the armor that AlQaida had seized earlier from the Yemeni Army.113
The Popular Committees played a key role in the
campaign and, in some areas, the Committee contribution to the fighting appears to have been decisive.
For example, in the fighting for the town of Lawdar,
local assessments claimed that the Yemeni Army had
been on the brink of defeat when the Committees
stepped in to defeat Al-Qaida.114 By June 2012, after
hard fighting, Al-Qaida was forced out of all its positions in Shabwa, Al-Bayda’, and Abyanprovinces.
Sometimes this was accomplished by means of combat or, in some cases, such as in the town of Azzan, by
agreement. In Azzan, Al -Qaida reportedly negotiated
directly with the Popular Committees to arrange for a
peaceful departure by its members before government
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forces could strike. It also preemptively evacuated all
the other towns in the area that it had seized earlier.115
To be sure, Al-Qaida’s defeat came at a high human
price for all players. For example, there were hundreds of dead locals in the Lawdar district, where the
fighting extended over a 5-week period.116 Likewise,
to retake the city of Zunjubar in Abyan province, official sources placed Army and Committee fighter losses at 280, although that number may well have been
considerably higher.117
Given the Army’s shortcomings, the Popular Committees have proved to be a crucial asset in the fight
against Al-Qaida especially since, according to a senior Yemeni security official, the Army is not welcome
in the southern and eastern parts of the country, given
the overrepresentation of Northerners in its command
structure.118 Moreover, the involvement of such local
forces helps mitigate the image of the Yemeni government’s dependence on the United States for support,
which can compromise its legitimacy.
The Committees’ Security Role.
Apart from contributing additional fighters in
the field, what the Committees made available to the
Yemeni military that the latter lacked was access to
intelligence and familiarity with the local terrain. In
addition, Popular Committees provide an irreplaceable capability of identifying and controlling individuals from their own tribe who would or have
joined Al-Qaida. They can even deal with symbolic
details such as banning Al-Qaida slogans on motorcycles.119 Of perhaps even greater importance, the
Popular Committees’ permanent presence has been
instrumental in hindering Al-Qaida’s mobility and
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initiative, thanks to a well-developed sense of territorial possession and the checkpoints that the Popular
Committees set up on their own lands, thus making
a major contribution to local security. As one Yemeni assessment saw it, a key reason for the Committees’ continuing effectiveness was that “each area
is defended by its own sons, as each Committee exercises its control within its own geographic space
. . . each on its own territory.”120 In fact, press reports
claimed that once the tribes took over the checkpoints in Hadramawt province in December 2013,
they proved more effective against Al-Qaida than the
Army had been.121
Moreover, given the absence of a strong Yemeni
police presence in many areas, the Committees have
provided law and order, as well as anti-terrorism
service, freeing additional government forces for the
anti-terrorist fight. The Committees have often been
responsible for identifying and detaining Al-Qaida
personnel and thus preventing potentially-significant
security incidents. There is also a record of thwarting many small-scale attacks, such as the case of the
arrest of an Al-Qaida operative at a wedding ceremony in Abyan province found to be wearing an
explosive vest.122
Al-Qaida’s Resurgence and the 2014
“ARMED DETERRENCE” Campaign.
Despite the government’s operational successes in
2012, the basic political environment in the country
did not change in many ways. There was persistent
in-fighting in the government and military, as well as
multiple threats to the government, including the Shia
Houthi movement in the North and the pro-separatist
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movements in the South, tribal dissidence, and a continuing neglect of many tribal areas in terms of services and political participation. This instability continued to provide fertile ground for Al-Qaida, which
was soon able to rally and reestablish many of its lost
positions, mounting embarrassing attacks on the government and security forces. Initially, Al-Qaida was
forced to revert to a focus on clandestine activity and
guerrilla operations characterized by low-level actions such as assassinations, kidnappings, small-scale
ambushes, and car bombs, punctuated only infrequently by bigger attacks against government targets.
By mid-2013, however, there was a return of a significant Al-Qaida military presence along with a sharp
rise in the size and lethality of its armed attacks. This
resurgence included strikes in the capital and against
Brigade-sized bases that caused significant casualties
and embarrassed the government.
Stung by the regeneration of the Al-Qaida threat,
the Yemeni government decided on a large-scale campaign in the spring of 2014. They targeted two southern provinces—Shabwa and Abyan—where Al-Qaida
had made the greatest inroads. Although the official
Yemeni news releases were not always reliable, the
government forces, which included both the Army
and police, appeared to have made significant progress. This resulted in extensive Al-Qaida casualties
and, progressively, the latter’s loss of virtually all the
territory it had controlled in those two provinces.
The Committees were an integral part of the 2014
campaign, featuring prominently in local news reporting. Abandoning the policy of neglect that had allowed the Committees to atrophy in many areas after
the campaign of 2012, the government, according to
one Yemeni source, now recruited 15,000 new Com-
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mittee fighters. That caused a significant expansion
of personnel—in reality and on paper—by the end of
2013.123 At least one tribe provided a Committee force
that was 600-strong for the 2014 campaign.124 Units of
over a hundred Committee fighters operating alongside the Army were not uncommon.125
Committee fighters were reported to have been
instrumental in locating both Al-Qaida strongholds
and refuges for the Army.126 As press photos from the
field show the Committees fought side-by-side with
the country’s Army and police—often out of their
home areas—as light infantry in conventional operations, although the Committees had previously had
no equipment or training for that role, apart from their
assumed ability to shoot and endure harsh conditions.
However, the fighters apparently were allowed to deploy only with their personal weapons. On at least one
occasion, the poorly-armed Committee fighters complained about being thrown into an engagement after
Al-Qaida had ambushed an Army unit.127
In addition, the Committees were used in clearing operations in urban areas and villages, and were
particularly effective in house-to-house searches.128 In
2014 as in the earlier campaign, the Committees sustained significant casualties. The battle for the town
of Lawdar in Abyan province alone reportedly resulted in more than 120 dead and 300 wounded in the
Committee ranks.129
Al-Qaida has continued to view the Popular
Committees as particularly troublesome, given their
competition with Al-Qaida for control of the same
tribal population and has sought to delegitimize the
Committees by labeling them “criminal gangs, highway robbers, and moral deviates” who serve foreign
interests.130 (See Figure 3.)
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Note: Al-Qaida anti-Popular Committee poster in Yemen: “Traitors: America’s Popular Committees in Lawdar,” available from
Al-Qaida websites, 2012.

Figure 3. Al-Qaida Anti-Popular Committee
Poster in Yemen.
Al-Qaida has also focused its attacks on the Popular Committee leadership as a way to undermine
their organizational effectiveness. This has resulted in
the death of a number of prominent tribal notables,
with one tribal shaykh commanding a Committee
who has survived no less than seven attempts on
his life. At the same time, Al-Qaida has appealed to
the Committees’ rank-and-file, as in an April 2014
communique, stressing the fact that Al-Qaida fighters came from the tribes too: “we are your brothers and sons, and the sons of the tribes.”Al-Qaida
argued that it was not in the tribesmen’s interests
to get involved in a protracted war and warned
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that it would fight against anyone who joined the
Committees.131
Managing the Popular Committees.
Despite their valuable contribution to the fight
against Al-Qaida, the Popular Committees in Yemen
have proved to be both a blessing and a bane for the
country’s long-term stability and for the government.
Complicating Traditional Governing Challenges.
The government found managing the Committees a challenge. To be sure, dealing with the tribes
had never been easy. However, the added presence of
Al-Qaida as a rival and the Committees’ new sense of
entitlement for the sacrifices they were making in the
fight against Al-Qaida made the situation even more
complex. Moreover, the tribes’ sense of empowerment
was bolstered by the government’s implicit admission
of its weakness. By recruiting the Popular Committees
it revealed its reliance on the tribes.
As events in Yemen repeatedly show, tribes are not
inert actors. They have their own interests. A shaykh
from a leading tribal confederation stated that, with
regard to the war against Al-Qaida, “The tribes will
do what they see as appropriate.”132 (See Figure 4.)
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Note: Underlining the Yemeni tribes’ control of territory, resentment at the Army’s presence, and enduring friction with
the central government, a tribesman chewing the traditional mild qat narcotic, frisks a soldier at a tribal checkpoint: “Do
you have any weapons on you, soldier?” Akhbar Al-Saa (Sanaa),
December 24, 2013.

Figure 4. Yemeni Poster Showing Soldier
at Tribal Checkpoint.
The inherent tribal commitment to autonomy
meant sensitivity to being used as a tool by the government and there was an initial reluctance to come
into conflict with Al-Qaida. As the head of the coordinating council of the Bakil, one of the country’s
two main tribal confederations, stressed, “We are not
government employees who have to pursue Al-Qaida
suspects.”133 Moreover, support for separatism in the
South reinforced the government’s ambivalence regarding the Popular Committees, which some in the
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South indeed saw as the nucleus of a future southern
army.134 The tribes’ general mistrust of the central government was reflected in the fact that, after the 2012
defeat of Al-Qaida, many of the tribes also wanted the
Army to leave their lands.
Accounting for Overlapping Tribal Loyalties.
Competing loyalties within the tribes has presented a recurring challenge to the Yemeni government in dealing with the Committees. Although the
government has promoted the idea that 70 percent of
Al-Qaida in Yemen is composed of foreigners, such
claims are highly dubious. By far, most members are
of local origin, and it is not surprising that in some
cases tribes may remain sympathetic to their fellowtribesmen even if they belong to a jihadist organization.135 Despite the conflict that has often arisen between Al-Qaida and tribal societies, traditional tribal
loyalties at times have trumped political allegiances
or ideological differences. Under the circumstances,
it was not surprising that after Al-Qaida’s defeat in
Abyan and Shabwa in 2012 some of its personnel reportedly were able to simply melt back into their own
tribes or even to join their tribe’s Popular Committee
for protection.136
The factor of tribal solidarity can complicate the
situation on the ground. In a typical attack in Abyan
province in September 2013, an Al-Qaida raiding party surprised an Army post being supported by local
tribal Committee personnel and a 2-hour firefight ensued. According to press reports, Al-Qaida was able
to withdraw without incurring any losses. Not only
did the engagement underline the Army’s poor intelligence about Al-Qaida, but also suggested the fact that
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locals very likely had helped the raiders to penetrate
the area. As some tribes have remained sympathetic
to Al-Qaida or at least neutral, following this raid the
local tribal Committee felt it necessary to warn other
tribes not to provide shelter to any of the withdrawing
Al-Qaida personnel.137
Dealing with Tribal Expectations.
Tribal interests can translate quickly into grievances. In Yemen, they have often proved to be sources of
friction, as dissatisfaction periodocally arose because
of the government’s treatment of the Committees in
particular and the Committee’s tribal communities
in general.
Friction between the Committees and the government has surfaced repeatedly in relation to complaints
about the continuing lack of government commitment, and may complicate the consolidation of the
government’s gains. The Popular Committees have
often grumbled about insufficient support in terms
of providing weapons. Some local observers suggest that the reason is that the government is wary of
maintaining well-armed militias that could prove a
threat to central authority.138 Committee fighters have
also complained that money from the government is
funneled through their tribal shaykhs instead of directly to them. Apparently, thanks to this arrangement, tribal shaykhs have often resorted to creating
“ghost fighters.” This inflates the Committee rosters
on paper for their own benefit and infuriates the fighters, who were said to have preferred that the money
be used instead to add more of those who are unemployed—no doubt their kinsmen—to the rolls.139 One
Committee in Abyan province complained that the
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government had not provided support for the families
of their comrades who had been killed or wounded as
had been promised, and that the Committee had not
received arms and vehicles, but had to make up losses
from their own means. More broadly, the same Committee grumbled that the government only collected
taxes but did not provide any services.140
The Yemeni press also released official documents
that highlight the government’s dysfunctional policy
toward the Popular Committees, revealing that, at one
point, the country’s Ministry of Defense was receiving five million Riyals ($23,000) from Saudi Arabia to
pay the Popular Committees every day, but that the
actual disbursement to the tribes was only two million Riyals a day, with accusations that the rest was
being diverted for personal use by government officials.141 One can imagine that such reports helped fuel
additional discontent against the government among
Committee fighters.
Committee fighters unhappy about late or unpaid
salaries have often blocked roads—one of the standard Yemeni protest methods—to highlight their discontent.142 In one case, angry Committees in Shabwa
province suspended their activity for a week in January 2014.143 In February 2014, one Committee commander in Abyan province quit in protest to what he
said was the government’s lack of payment, a move
which the other commanders in the province supported, threatening to do the same unless such problems
were addressed.144 Complaining that the government
was ignoring its rights and not addressing its demands, at the height of the fighting, the Committee in
Ataq, the capital of Shabwa province, called a 1-week
strike in May 2014, suspending its field operations.145
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Command and control issues for the Committees
during the 2014 campaign proved challenging in the
field for the Yemeni military. In at least one reported
incident, the Committees in two districts of Abyan
withdrew from an active front, complaining that they
were not getting adequate food from the military and
that the latter was controlling their movement.146 According to other Yemeni press accounts, the military
commander in this instance was glad to see the Committee return home, as he had narrowly escaped an
assassination attempt by one of its members, and he
feared that the force had been penetrated by Al-Qaida.147 Other reports told of the Committees looting
weapons and equipment from Army units reluctant
to take the field.148
Moreover, the Committees believe the Yemeni
government has assumed a responsibility to integrate
their fighters into the security and government sectors. While the Yemeni authorities have indeed promised that these fighters eventually could be absorbed
into the military, police, or civil service, it is difficult to
find places for additional personnel either in the bloated government bureaucracy or the partisan and costly
military and police. Some Committee personnel have
protested the broken promises of government jobs by
blocking roads.149 Although the creation of the Popular Committees has helped absorb some of the unemployed youth in the tribes, this is only a temporary
solution. It is also one that can generate a backlash
if the cash-strapped government neglects or decides
to discontinue financing the program, thereby providing Al-Qaida with a more benign operational environment, as occurred in Iraq under similar circumstances.
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Some Southerners have also begun to resent what
they feel is the Army’s use of southern tribal personnel
as cannon fodder in high-casualty out-of-area operations. They claim the government was willing to do so
in order to spare northern lives and to weaken, if not
eliminate, the Popular Committees. For example, as
the 2014 campaign was unfolding, one editorial asked,
“Why are the Popular Committees taking part in this
campaign which is being described as a campaign
against Al-Qaida in Abyan and Shabwa, since this is a
job for the Army?”150 The editorial further accused the
government of hoping to see the Popular Committees’
commanders perish in the fighting.
Significantly, the Committees are a newly-legitimized armed actor that enables tribes to more easily
reject central government authority and, at the same
time, undercut national unity. From the beginning of
their existence, a number of clashes have occurred between the Army and the Committees, such as when
the latter refused to hand over to the Army government buildings that Committee members had seized
from Al-Qaida in Azzan in July 2012.151 There, and
elsewhere, security matters have often since been performed independently by both the Committees and
the Army, including duplicate security checkpoints
on the roads.152 Confrontations over the authority to
set up checkpoints have continued to occur and have
sometimes led to armed clashes between the Committees and the Army, as was the case in Hadramawt
province in January 2014.153
As part of the 2014 campaign, the Yemeni government also promised the tribes that it would provide
more public services. For example, after the retaking
of the town of Al-Mahfad, the visiting newly-appointed provincial governor announced “a new page,” and
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promised that the government would restore communications, and bring electric power, water, and health
services to the local population.154 However, whether
the Yemeni government, perennially short of cash and
of experts, can meet such promises in a timely manner, or whether it wants to strengthen the hand of the
tribes, remains in doubt. In fact, by June 2014, the local Committees and tribesmen in Abyan were already
protesting against the government. They were angry
that no compensation had been paid for the damage
they incurred as a result of recent government operations against Al-Qaida, as well as the lack of improvement in the provision of public services.155 Elsewhere,
as in Radfan in Lahij province, the Committees closed
roads in June 2014 as they demanded back pay, which
had been interrupted for 3 months.156
Clearly, in 2014 Al-Qaida lost the towns it had controlled and was pushed out of the two affected provinces, suffering extensive casualties and equipment
losses in the process. Yemen Minister of Defense Major General Muhammad Nasr declared by early-May
2014 that government forces had “broken the back
of Al-Qaida” and would not stop until Al-Qaida had
been eliminated entirely.157 The operational success of
the 2014 campaign notwithstanding, it may still be too
early to judge whether the setback will translate into
Al-Qaida’s demise or simply become part of a sinewave pattern in Yemen of defeat and regeneration for
the latter. In fact, there were indications that Al-Qaida
may have been repeating its earlier strategy of withdrawing to preserve its force structure and awaiting
more suitable operational conditions. The Yemeni
Army itself spoke of Al-Qaida’s “wholesale flight,”
and some Al-Qaida fighters simply melted back into
their tribes, as they had done after the 2012 defeat. A
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case in point: as part of a deal the tribes in one area
brokered between the Army and Al-Qaida during the
2014 campaign, only outsiders were required to leave,
while local Al-Qaida members could return home.158
The bulk of Al-Qaida fighters seem to have redeployed
to other provinces, such as neighboring Hadramawt,
where there were existing safe-houses and camps, but
also further afield as in Lahij, Ma’rib, and Ibb provinces, suggesting this was not a decisive campaign,
with some Yemenis intimating that deals were made
to allow Al-Qaida to withdraw.159 At the same time,
Al-Qaida was still able to continue launching mostly
small and mid-scale strikes, including in the capital.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY
Conclusion.
Present indications suggest that Al-Qaida and its
affiliates—Al-Qaida for shorthand here—will continue to seek to operate in tribal societies, and that
challenge will require an effective counter. Based on
the cases of Iraq and Yemen, the preceding analysis
suggests the positive results of using tribal militias in
the fight against Al-Qaida may be significant. Within
the context of fighting against Al-Qaida, encouraging
and supporting any armed local constituency—such
as Iraq’s tribes—may be a reasonable or even an unavoidable option at a particular juncture either for an
outside power or a local patron in dealing with that
insurgency. The establishment of such militias may
reduce or even obviate the need for a large U.S. Landpower footprint that could be costly both materially
and in political terms. The creation of tribal militias
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by or with the consent of local governments is most
conducive to success, and the ultimate impact of such
militias will depend on the local government’s treatment of the tribal sector. Nevertheless, as is often true
in the real world, this is not a panacea, and, based on
past experience, there are cautionary guidelines to
be remembered for the creation and function of such
tribal militias that could make the difference between
success or ultimate failure.
Each of the two models studied has political and
military advantages and disadvantages, but one may
not have the luxury of which option to select in a specific situation. Comparing Model 1 and Model 2 suggests some general conclusions:
In Model 1 (as in Iraq—Phase I), an outside patron
in control, acting as the de facto governing authority,
may be able to exercise better command and control,
ensure more efficient use of money and other aid, and
prevent or moderate the tribal militia’s use for sectarian purposes than might a corrupt or ineffective national government. An outside patron may be more
effective than a national government that may itself be
a political player and potentially hostile to the tribal
sector, which it might view as a rival. At the same
time, a lack of permanence may make it difficult for
an outside patron to ensure that the achievements of
the militias it supported will be maintained once it
leaves. In some instances, this model may be the only
option available in the absence of an effective national
government to act as patron, as was the case in many
of the Sunni areas of Iraq in the years after Saddam
Hussein‘s fall.
In Model 2 (as in Iraq—Phase II and in Yemen),
with a foreign patron in a support mode and a national government in charge, the latter may have the ad-
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vantage of credibility in offering permanent support
to the tribal militias and their parent tribes, which a
foreign patron, with its short-term horizon, ordinarily will not. This model may also be less sensitive for
an emerging local government’s legitimacy than a foreign patron would be. In this model, there is an inherent tension and mistrust between any government in
the Middle East, traditionally prone to centralize control, and any armed tribal force that may seek greater
autonomy and establishes the capability to do so. This
paradigm is only superseded temporarily by a dire
need to confront Al-Qaida, as demonstrated when the
Iraqi government revived the Sahwa in 2013, despite
its manifest discomfort with the Sunni tribes, in order
to deal with a deteriorating security situation. In some
cases, this may also be the only option available, as the
United States may not be on the ground and in control
of a country.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy.
Whether the United States finds itself in the role of
the director patron of a tribal militia as in Model 1 or
as a supporter of a local patron as in Model 2, there are
several recommendations that can help it be effective
and avoid potential pitfalls in planning and executing policy. U.S. policymakers must assess each theater
individually and tailor the general concept of tribal
militias accordingly. There is no single template. Each
country differs in its tribal structure, social norms, history of interaction with the central government, and
the character of the local Al-Qaida movement. Nevertheless, there are some commonalities and general
guidelines that can make U.S. policy more effective.
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In Model 1, with the United States as the direct
patron of militias, it should:
•	
Understand the strengths and limitations of
tribal militias and shape the latter’s roles and
missions accordingly. Tribal militias are most
effective operating on their own territory. In
particular, tribal militias have a good knowledge of the human and physical terrain in their
own tribal areas, built up over generations.
Tribal members have the linguistic skills, familiarity with customs, and personal acquaintance with individuals that enables them to
identify outsiders and suspicious locals. They
can be used for sensitive tasks such as searching homes in their own tribal area. Coupled
with their permanent presence on the terrain,
they can provide stability once an area has been
made secure by heavier forces. As such, even
after the major fighting has ended, tribal militias, in conjunction with the police, can play a
positive role in controlling an area, and maintaining the general security that contributes to
preventing an environment in which Al-Qaida
could regenerate. Conversely, although potentially proficient in small-scale engagements,
tribal militias ordinarily lack the armaments,
training, and command and control for largerscale conventional operations against a skilled
and well-armed opponent as Al-Qaida can be
at times, such as in present-day Iraq. Out-ofarea operations may be risky for tribal militias,
as they may be at a disadvantage in terms of
familiarity with the terrain and social milieu,
while increasing the likelihood of their engaging in plunder and other misdeeds against the
residents outside their tribe.
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•	
Support a tribal militia adequately in material terms. In most areas where Al-Qaida is
operating, either the population traditionally
has suffered economic and social neglect or is
hurting now because of the instability. While
some individuals will be motivated for ideological reasons, many others will be influenced
by material needs. Funding must be sufficient
to pay salaries that will attract tribal fighters,
as well as to provide goods such as food and
fuel, and social services to the fighters’ tribes.
As in Iraq, salaries, job-creating projects, provision of materiel and social services, can be basic
elements ensuring a committed Sahwa. Such
civil projects and services can be tied directly
to the tribal militias. The deterioration of such
support by the follow-on patron had negative
consequences that proved difficult to overcome. Providing the militias with the military
means is also necessary, including supplying
arms, munitions, and vehicles at the appropriate level. The militias must have effective operational support from their patron in the form
of U.S. forces, focused on such complementary
capabilities as fires (air and ground), logistics,
intelligence, information operations, and help
with mobility.
•	Provide effective protection for key tribal militia leaders from inevitable Al-Qaida efforts
to eliminate them, which could have serious
consequences for the effectiveness of a militia.
Every effort should be made to convince the
follow-on government of the need for that protection to continue. Otherwise, the lack of effective provisions for post-handover security may
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reduce the readiness of tribesmen to join a militia against Al-Qaida, fearful of their subsequent
abandonment by their patron. Understandably,
Sahwa leaders were concerned about their own
safety before the U.S. withdrawal, and Al-Qaida has continued to target such leaders and
their families.160
•	In what is frequently a fragmented tribal political environment, discourage the use of tribal
militias in inter-tribal feuds and avoid becoming involved in inter-tribal and intra-tribal rivalries unless this impedes the effectiveness of
the tribal militia. Tribes may well be divided
on whether or not to support a militia and/or
the national government, and individual tribes
may also be fractured internally on this issue, as
has been the case in both Iraq and Yemen. For
example, in Iraq during Phase I, as one shaykh
in Diyala province concluded:
The tribes are split between supporters and opponents of cooperation with the American forces in the latter’s fight against Al-Qaida. Some
of these tribes face accusations of treason for
standing with the Americans.

 ven some tribes who disliked Al-Qaida apparE
ently had an equal distaste for the Americans
and would have preferred to deal with Al-Qaida on their own.161 To become a player in local politics can create enemies without creating
friends.
•	Ensure that the U.S. management and use of
tribal militias do not undercut an existing or
emerging government’s legitimacy. Insofar as
possible, the United States should involve an
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emerging local government in decisionmaking
on the tribal militias and U.S. support (financing, arming, training, intelligence sharing) is
best carried out through the local government
if feasible.
Even if successful in terms of increasing security,
fielding tribal forces may lay the groundwork for
longer-term consequences with which a local government will have to deal eventually. In particular, the
arming and encouraging of any tribal group may raise
the latter’s expectations and demands for autonomy.
As a result, the tribes, with a legitimate military force,
may be more likely to challenge the development of
an emerging government’s authority, heightening the
likelihood of future violence and for Al-Qaida to take
advantage. More generally, over the long term, supporting a tribal system can impede or derail the development of a more stable civil society. Both in Iraq and
Yemen, certain urban circles have continued to exhibit
considerable hostility to tribal values and influence,
seeing in the latter a pre-modern mode of thinking
and way of life, and urban intellectuals sometimes
criticize tribalism openly.162 At least while under its
tutelage, the United States should seek to discourage
tribal militias from acting as an armed political player.
•	Craft a realistic and effective demobilization
plan and ensure it is in place when and if the
need for such forces ends—whether U.S. forces
are still in charge or whether authority has been
transferred to the local government—to ensure
the success achieved is not undone. The United
States must convince the follow-on government
of the importance that any explicit or implicit
commitments for material support continue af-
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ter a handover, and the United States must be
careful about the promises it makes. At times,
the inability to fulfill promises, as perceived by
the locals, generated disillusionment within
the Sahwa about the Americans. As one Sahwa
commander put it:
The Americans are duplicitous and treacherous, and dispose of papers they are finished
with by burning them . . . Unfortunately, earlier, we were obliged to work with them in
order to secure our area, not to protect their
soldiers who were being killed on a daily
basis by Al-Qaida . . . I advise everyone not
to cooperate with them in the future, since
their fate will be the same as that of the tribal
Sahwa in Iraq.163

 uch negative impressions could create potenS
tial reservations among the tribal populations
in other countries about committing themselves
to similar militias. As one Yemeni analyst observed, suddenly demobilizing and not integrating this force into the security forces could
make the fighters feel like “hired guns,” and
they could well turn against the government.164
As demobilization may add to the local government’s long-term burden, the United States
should assist even after a handover in order to
ensure a successful process. In most cases, demobilization is not a question of just disarming
tribal militias in the immediate post-conflict period. Most tribal societies have always been or
have become armed cultures, especially when
the central government had collapsed or was
weak. (See Figure 5.)
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Note: Highlighting the deep-rooted attachment of Yemeni tribes
to their weapons, a little boy says: “I wish I were an automatic rifle so that Daddy would love me more and would always take me
with him.” See Kamal Sharq, Al-Jumhuriya (Sanaa), June 10, 2014.

Figure 5. Yemeni Tribal Cartoon.
In light of the culture and the real possibility of a
continuing need for self-protection, it would be unrealistic to demand a relinquishing of personal arms and
would be likely to elicit resistance. Instead, the focus
should be on persuading the follow-on local government patron to integrate former tribal fighters into the
security, government, and civil sectors if and when
the Al-Qaida threat has been eliminated for good. To
prepare for demobilization, the United States should
take advantage of the security and time gained by a
tribal militia’s success to build local government capacity. This will help to ensure the emergence of a
stable and effective domestic authority able to assume
control of the country and the militia, if the latter is
still needed. Otherwise, a tribal militia left in control
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of an area and lacking government supervision could
well lead to abuses against the civilian population.
•	Conduct an effective information campaign directed toward the tribes. In particular, U.S. policy should focus on the enemy and be shaped
to appeal to the tribes. This policy would take
advantage of Al-Qaida’s critical vulnerabilities
in ideology and its relationship with a country’s tribal base. Al-Qaida will seek to undermine the tribal militia’s leadership and appeal
to tribal fighters, promising money, playing
on religious sentiments, kinship ties, shame
about cooperating with an occupier and an
“apostate” local government, It will also play
upon fears that the foreign patron will abandon
the militia and leave the fighters defenseless.
(See Figure 6.)

Note: ISI poster against the Sahwa: “A Sahwa member will not get
past the Islamic State of Iraq; there is no place among us for the
Sahwa.” Al-Qaida’s Al-Luyuth forum, August 2011.

Figure 6. ISI Poster.
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At a cruder level, Al-Qaida will intimidate tribal
militias by threatening and carrying out assassinations, kidnapping, and attacks on family members.
(see Figure 7.) Clearly, the United States needs to
neutralize this strategy through both its own information effort and with tangible measures that invalidate
such claims.

Note: ISI poster intended to intimidate the Sahwa and Iraq’s other
security forces: “This is the last thing a Sahwa member, a soldier,
and an apostate policeman see in the Islamic State of Iraq,” AlQaida websites, 2010.

Figure 7. ISI Poster.
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Even in a Model 2 situation, the United States can
make essential contributions to the success of the tribal militias while avoiding direct involvement on the
ground, and should:
•	
Provide funding, arms, selected operational
support, intelligence, and advice—either in direct support of the local patron government operating jointly with the tribal militia or intended for the tribal militia but channeled through
the patron local government. For example, in
2013, the United States supplied small arms to
the Iraqi government and specifically urged
the latter to transfer that equipment to the reconstituted Sahwa.165 In the 2014 campaign in
Yemen, U.S. support to the government forces
came in the form of airstrikes, additional U.S.
arms and equipment, and other U.S. direct operational support, including reportedly flying
Yemeni commandos within the battle zone.166
Although such support may not have been earmarked for the Popular Committees, it clearly
also benefited the latter as they operated alongside the government forces. In another example
of outside support, Saudi Arabia, as noted, has
provided much of the funding for the Popular
Committees in Yemen, funneling that through
the latter country’s Ministry of Defense. Riyadh
has also provided medical evacuation for a key
Committee commander in 2012.
•	Advise the local government on how to best
deal with the tribal militias. Recently, the U.S.
administration conducted consultations with
Iraqi leaders, suggesting strategy, urging outreach to the tribal leaders, and publicly prais-
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ing Baghdad’s decision to extend benefits to the
tribal militias.167 In 2014, the U.S. administration also publicly encouraged the integration
of Sahwa fighters into Iraq’s security forces.168
In terms of supporting the Sahwa’s patron in
combat operations in 2013-14, the United States
helped by having U.S. Special Forces train
Iraqi Special Forces in Jordan and by providing advice, equipment, and intelligence, and
reportedly launched drone strikes from Jordan
against Al-Qaida targets.169
•	Advise and support other countries that might
act in the future as potential patrons of tribal
militias’ use a tool against Al-Qaida. Both Algeria and Mali, for example, have considered
tribal militias, while France could become a
sponsor in the Sahel.170
•	Identify personnel from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps with operational experience working with tribal militias, and allow them to act
as instructors for future U.S. operations and as
advisers to allied efforts when they consider
establishing such forces.
AN UPDATE
Since the time that this text was completed in the
early summer of 2014, a new government, led by
Haydar Al-Ibadi, replaced that of Prime Minister AlMaliki in Iraq. A combination of a modified Army,
Coalition airpower, and Kurdish and Shia militias has
been successful in stemming the Islamic State’s (ISIS)
momentum but, although Prime Minister Al-Ibadi
has a declared policy of accommodating the Sunni
community, in many ways a hardening of sectarian
positions has also occurred.
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Significantly, as part of the fight against the ISIS,
a U.S.-backed plan emerged for the establishment of
a “National Guard” as a provincial force which will
include current and former Sahwa fighters in trained
maneuver units armed with heavier weaponry and
meant to reassure Al-Anbar and other predominantly
Sunni areas. Given the reality of the social structures
of the intended areas, tribal loyalties and power relationships will still have to be considered. In effect,
representatives from the United States and Iraq were
said to be negotiating with Sunni tribal shaykhs on
the parameters of this new National Guard, which is
likely to resemble a “Sahwa-plus.” At the same time,
the retention of a more traditional Sahwa as a complementary local home guard with a permanent territorial security presence would also be useful.
In the meantime, a resolution of Sunni-Shia differences on the very need for a National Guard, as well
as on its size, armament, mission, membership—including whether to also admit Shia militiamen—and
its relationship to the Baghdad government and the
national security forces is still pending. Ultimately,
for the success of any Sunni-based force in the fight
against ISIS, differences on such broader political issues as the role of the former Bath Party and officers
from Saddam’s army, the presence of resurgent Shia
militias in Sunni areas, the appropriate use of government air power, the desirability of Coalition ground
forces in Iraq, amnesty for tribal supporters of ISIS,
and the reform of Army and police structures will still
have to be settled. In whatever way the Sahwa concept
evolves, the issues addressed above will likely still remain relevant for any tribally-based society and force.
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